I am always intrigued by things i find curious and this has been one of those cases.
A week before Papandreou proposed a Referendum, i was discussing with G the protests in Greece and he argued that the protests are good, in that they show that Papandreou does not have a strong hold in the country. This should allow him to negotiate better terms with Troika, based on Thomas Schelling's argument (in The Strategy of Conflict 1960) that the less a Prime Minister/President is in control of the country he governs (or shows that he is not in control), the more negotiating power he has vis-a-vis other governments.
When Papandreou proposed the referendum, it reminded me of Schelling.
And it was, judging from the first responses of other EU leaders who reacted by stating that 'the 27 October deal cannot be renegotiated'.
(the blackmailing 'you want the Euro or not' came later)
Papandreou's proposal to go to referendum was received positively by many (foreign) analysts:
"I’m totally elated by this referendum. The Europeans are mostly confused and on the wrong track, so they need a big shake-up to restart and get on a new basis.
I’m deeply shocked by the useless austerity imposed on the Greeks. The situation in Greece is deteriorating day after day and they are not going to improve their budget deficit while the economy is shrinking. This is all decided in a very undemocratic way and imposed on the Greek government; its sovereignty is being infringed, so this referendum is a welcome occasion to introduce an element of democracy in this process, which has been extraordinarily technocratic." (Charles Wyplosz - Graduate Institute Geneva)
On the other hand, Wall Street Journal's quote clearly illustrated how bad democracy is for Brussels:
'Referendums are anathema in Brussels, where scripted summits and handed-down directives are more the style than popular votes and their messy democratic outcomes.'
However, what I found most striking is the contrast between 1) the reception of the proposal for Referendum by the international media and analysts vs. 2) the Greek media, and from what i understood from my family, from most Greeks as well.
I really could not understand why so many Greeks would be against a Referendum. For me it just illustrated a junky-ish dependency on the bail-out and a misunderstanding of the situation we are in. At this point it does not matter if we'll go to elections. We no longer have sovereignty so no matter who we elect they will not have much room for negotiations.
In addition, a default and Euro exit vs. staying in the Euro is not an easy or clear choice because both options are really bad-
its either
1. sovereignty, default, a short period of hell and then recovery or
2. the Euro, Brussels and a longer period of hell and then (perhaps) recovery....
And both scenarios will have many more unknown, painful effects.
So for me, the 'small' shake up that the referendum proposal created was good. It clearly illustrated that the EU and the Eurozone are highly undemocratic institutions and that if we do wish to remain in it, we have to really forget about the Greece we grew up in and the Greece we claim to want.
It also showed that many Greek opposition parties and complaining civilians were not really against the bail-out. Apparently they were for it all along!
So Papandreou's referendum proposal clarified a few things for all to see:
- The Greek opposition parties support the Bail-Out
- The Greek people support the Bail-Out
- When in Eurozone, you are not in a democracy
Obvious to many in the past, now very clear to all.
It no longer matters if Papandreou intended to go to referendum or not. However, I do think that if Greeks had embraced the idea of going to referendum, it would have put a lot more pressure on Brussels (and Greeks but Greeks are getting pressured anyways).
--- Here's an article on the relationship between Greek bonds and German car sales in Greece
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-11-02/markets/30349335_1_greece-car-sales-eurozone
----and an analysis of the 'European Democracy'
http://crookedtimber.org/2011/11/01/european-democracy/
PS. By this I am not excusing/forgetting/forgiving the responsibility of the Greek political elite for this situation. If I were to negotiate the terms of the bail-out with the troika I would ask them to take all Greek politicians to Brussels and keep them there.
Have a good Saturday
6 σχόλια:
Πολύ ωραία ανάλυση, Xana. Οι εξωτερικές ματιές μας βοηθούν πάντα να δούμε τα πράγματα πιο σφαιρικά.
Στο θέμα, δεν ήταν όλη η αντιπολίτευση που δεν ήθελε τη διενέργεια δημοψηφίσματος. Ούτε όλος ο λαός, παρά σε αναλογία 80/20. ( http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22767&subid=2&pubid=63522980 )
Το πρόβλημα ήταν ότι το υποτιθέμενο ερώτημα υπήρξε προβληματικό, αντιφατικό. Και φυσικά η χυδαία ολίσθησή του σε "Ευρώπη or not" που το ώθησαν πολλοί.
Σε αυτή τη συγκυρία είναι θετικό το ότι δεν έγινε τελικά, αφού το αποτέλεσμα θα ήταν στρεβλωμένο με την έννοια ότι ο καθένας θα απαντούσε σε άλλο ερώτημα επί της ουσίας.
checkout my note here
in fact what I was talking about from the very start was that the only viable foreign-affairs strategy would be for #Greece to pursue indignados & occupy rhetorics as a global and EU perspective. THIS would be the way for the discussion you re reffering to be broaden up. The way gaP did. well, it's all out there
Tic Tac: i think there is a reason that the 'question' was not ever posed, and the reason it was scheduled so far ahead- it showed that it left room for negotiations which perhaps also allowed it to be taken back.
and I don't think that the discussion of leaving the Eurozone had no grounds-
in any case, maybe it is for the best that it was taken back, although I really wish that the reaction from Greece had not been so negative.
Chaca: i agree with your comment- it just showed that we are reluctant to make decisions for ourselves.
Regarding the occupy/indignados discourse, I don't think that we can do that as our crisis is a debt or the state's-mismanagement-of-funds-crisis and not that our state does not regulate the banks (like in the U.S.) which allows them to fuck everyone up or that we have low taxation on the rich (here i'm talking in theory, how the system is set up, not whether we actually do collect the taxes or not)
I do think that there's a lot to be said on a European level about the policies that only profit a limited amount of people (for example German companies and not their citizens) and policies that benefit Northern Europe vs. the Periphery but that is a line that EU peripheral countries have to pursue together and at the moment they seem to be acting on individual negotiations with the 'north' as opposed to talking to each other...
i d be the last one to diminish our political body, culture & system's responsibilities. this is something should be also addressed with same or more urgency. but check out this really eye-popping graph!
αυτός ακριβώς πάντως είναι ο δρόμος που εννοώ κι εγώ. πρώτος ορίζοντας θα ήταν η συμμαχία με την περιφέρεια (bytheway φαντάσου πόσο οι πιο γαμάτοι όλης της γης θα ήταν τα μέλη μιας ένωσης ελλ-ιταλ-ισπαν-πορτογ-αντε κ ιρλανδιας! μιλάμε για το νόημα της ζωής!)
anyway, στα λοιπά το πρόβλημα με το λαό που δε συζήτησε την υπόθεση δημοψήφισμα είναι ότι η ιδέα είχε στόχο να εκβιάσει περισσότερο εμάς παρά τους ευρωπαίους ως όφειλε -με άλλους τρόπους και σε άλλους χρόνους. γι αυτό και πήρε πόδι καταυτόν τον τρόπο
αι θινκ ινγκλις ιζ ε μπαντ τσόις... (προβλέψιμο κόμμεντ)
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